THE VALUE-RELEVANCE OF INTANGIBLES: THE CASE OF SOFTWARE CAPITALIZATION

Introduction
We examine the relevance to investors of information on the capitalization of software development costs, in accordance with Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 86 (SFAS 86).
1 Software capitalization, the only exception in the U.S. to the full expensing rule of R&D (SFAS 2), pertains to the development component of R&D. It therefore provides a laboratory experiment for an accounting treatment of intangibles that differs from the nearly-universal full expensing of intangible assets. 2 Our examination of the 10-year record of SFAS 86 is also motivated by the 1996 petition from the Software Publishers Association (SPA) to abolish the standard. The FASB has indicated (ÒAction Alert,Ó August 28, 1996) that it will consider the petition.
The major claim put forward by the SPA is that, given industry changes since 1986, capitalization of software development costs does not benefit investors:
The rationale underlying the capitalization of software development costs is to recognize the existence of an asset of the corporation. However, an asset should be recognizedÉ. only if ultimate realization of the asset is reasonably assured É Due to factors such as the ever-increasing volatility in the software marketplace, the compression of product cycles, the heightened level of competition and the divergence of technology platforms, realization of software assets has become increasingly uncertain even at the point of technological feasibilityÉ. We do not believe that software development costs are a useful predictive factor of future product sales. (SPA March 14, 1996 letter, p.4).
To bolster their claim, the Software Publishers Association invokes investorsÕ attitudes toward Òsoft assetsÓ:
The members of the SPA CFO Committee, É have indicated the substantial majority of their investors, underwriters, and financial analysts believe financial reporting by software companies is improved when all software development costs are charged to expense as incurred. These users of financial statements do not believe the recording of a ÒsoftÓ asset for the software being developed is particularly relevant and does not aid the user of financial statements. The users of financial statementsÉ have a high degree of skepticism when it comes to soft assets resulting from the capitalization of software development costs. (SPA, March 14, 1996 letter, p.5).
Thus, the Software Publishers Association concludes:
Financial reporting and financial statements would be more reliable and consistent if all software development costs were required to be charged to expense.
We examine the relevance to investors of public information on software capitalization by analyzing both associations of financial data with capital market observables and earnings forecast accuracy. We also provide evidence on potential motives underlying the software industryÕs petition to abolish SFAS 86, and the apparent endorsement of this petition by some financial analysts. This petition raises intriguing interest group questions, since software capitalization was strongly supported in 1985 by the then trade group of software companies --ADAPSO (The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations). 3 The shift in attitudes toward capitalization is particularly puzzling given the flexibility of SFAS 86, which largely enables those who wish to capitalize to do so and others to immediately expense software developments costs. AnalystsÕ objection to capitalization is equally intriguing, since software capitalization can be easily undone by subtracting the periodic capitalization figure from reported earnings and the capitalized software asset from total assets and equity. At best, capitalization is informative about the success of software development programs and at worst the information can be ignored.
For a sample of 163 firms during the period 1987-1995, we find that annually capitalized development costs are positively associated with stock returns and the cumulative software asset reported on the balance sheet is associated with stock prices. Furthermore, software capitalization data are associated with subsequent reported earnings, indicating another dimension of relevance to investors. We find no support for the view that the judgment involved in software capitalization decreases the quality of reported earnings. Finally, we document a significant association between development costs which were fully expensed by firms not following SFAS 86 and subsequent stock returns, consistent with a delayed investor reaction to product development of these companies.
In probing the reasons for the software producersÕ change in attitude towards the capitalization of software development cost, we document a significant mid-1990Õs shift in the impact of software capitalization on reported earnings and return-on-equity of software companies.
Whereas in the early period of SFAS 86 application (mid-to late-1980s) software capitalization increased reported earnings more than the decrease in earnings by the amortization of the software asset (since that asset was still small), during the early 1990s the gap between the earnings impacts of capitalization and amortization narrowed, and in 1995, the capitalization and amortization positive and negative effects were roughly offsetting. This impact on reported performance may have been among the reasons underlying the SPAÕs petition to abolish SFAS 86. AnalystsÕ objection to capitalization may be related to the random element introduced by capitalization to reported earnings which, in turn, complicates the forecasting task. Indeed, we find that analystsÕ earnings forecast errors are positively associated with the intensity of software capitalization.
Our evaluation of the 10-year record of software capitalization in the U.S. is timely given the current interest in accounting for intangibles. For example, the FASB has recently established a Task
Force on Business Combinations to examine, among other things, the accounting treatment of acquired intangibles, some of which (R&D-in-process) are immediately expensed by acquirers (Deng and Lev 1998). 4 Also, the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA (AcSEC)
released in March 1998 a Statement of Position on accounting for software for internal use (SFAS 86, the focus of this study, deals with software intended for sale), calling for the capitalization of certain development costs in a similar manner to SFAS 86. Abroad, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) is about to issue Standard No. 38 on intangibles which calls for the capitalization of internally developed intangibles with identifiable benefits (IASC, 1998). While SFAS 86 deals only with the capitalization of post-feasibility development costs, an assessment of the record of SFAS 86 should benefit the reexamination of accounting for intangibles.
Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
The initial sample for this study was the 463 firms on the 1995 Compustat Industrial and
Research files classified as computer programming and prepackaged software (SIC codes 7370-7372).
We excluded 130 firms with fewer than three years of existence as a public company during 1987-1995, to accommodate certain tests which require limited time-series data (e.g., for computing twoyear lagged changes in earnings). Eighty firms of the 130 deleted had an initial public offering in 1994 or 1995, while the remaining 50 were acquired or ceased to operate after fewer than three years as a public company. 5 We also excluded 64 firms which were not engaged in developing software products and 56 firms (primarily non-US registrants) with no price or return data on the 1995 CRSP net capitalized software asset, the annual software development expense, the annual capitalized software amount, the annual amortization of the software asset, and the occasional write-offs of capitalized software.
6 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample companies. 7 The sales and total assets figures indicate that over the examined period (1987-95) software companies, on average, quadrupled in size (doubling at the median). For both sales and total assets, the means are substantially larger than the medians, indicating that the sample includes a small number of very large companies. The increasing sample size (N) indicates that the software industry has not yet gone through a Òshakeout period,Ó typical of maturing industries, where the number of firms grows quickly during an initial stage, which is followed by a fast decline (shakeout) and stabilization of the number of competitors.
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The return on equity (ROE) figures in Table 1 indicate that the median sample ROE ranged between 10 and 20 percent during 1987-1992, decreasing to 8-15 percent in 1993-95 (the mean ROE fluctuates widely because of a few outliers). 9 The reduced ROE figures in recent years, reflecting intensified competition and continued entry, are yet another indication that the software industry has not reached maturity. The steadily increasing market-to-book ratio, at both the mean and the median, indicates that investorsÕ growth expectations of the software industry keep rising. The median debt-to-equity ratios are very small, yet at the mean, a software company has roughly a 5:1 capitalization ratio, at book values.
Capitalization intensity (the annually capitalized portion of software development costs divided by total development costs, expensed as well as capitalized) --is among the key variables we examine. Both the mean and median values are stable at 25-30 percent through 1992 and decline thereafter. This apparent sharp decline of capitalization intensity is mainly driven by recent entrants to the industry, who tend to capitalize less than older companies. For example, in 1987, sample firms that were publicly traded for two years or less had a mean (median) capitalization intensity of 30% (27%), whereas in 1995, similarly young firms had a mean (median) capitalization intensity of 7.9% (0%). 10 In contrast, mature sample firms that were public for at least 8 years had a stable mean capitalization ratio of 23% throughout the 1987-1995 period, while their median capitalization intensity decreased from 18% to 15%. 
Distinguishing ÒCapitalizersÓ from ÒExpensersÓ
Since SFAS 86 affords considerable implementation flexibility to software companies, it is important to distinguish at the outset between software capitalizers and immediate expensers.
11
Doing so sheds light on whether capitalization is practiced by underperforming companies to enhance their reported earnings and provides control variables. 1. Firm Size, measured as the log of market value of equity three months after fiscal yearend. Large firms tend to spend a substantial part of software development costs on basic research and on maintenance and upgrades of their products. These costs are expensed according to SFAS 86 (see appendix), and consequently, large firms are expected to expense a larger share of development costs than smaller firms.
2. Software Development Intensity, measured by the ratio of annual software development costs to sales. To the extent that economies of scale characterize the software industry, firms which spend more on software development will experience, on average, a higher success rate in developing products, leading to a larger capitalization share. Accordingly, we expect a positive association between development intensity and capitalization rate.
3. Profitability, measured by net income converted to full expensing (i.e., income plus software amortization, minus the annually capitalized software) divided by sales. Given analystsÕ skepticism about software capitalization, it is widely believed that profitable companies avoid capitalization in order not to taint the perceived quality of their earnings in analystsÕ eyes.
4. Leverage, measured by long-term debt divided by book value of equity (minus the software assets). Leverage is a proxy for the restrictiveness of loan covenants as motivators of capitalization; firms closer to loan restrictions may favor capitalization which increases equity and earnings.
5. Systematic Risk, or β. Basic research is in general riskier than product development.
Basic research is also expensed according to SFAS 86, while product development is capitalized. Thus, riskier firms, namely those devoting a larger share of development efforts to basic research, can be expected to expense more than less risky companies. Table 2 reports coefficient estimates from a regression of capitalization intensity (scaled by market value) on these five firm-specific attributes. 14 The four variables found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level are: size (log of market value), firm profitability, software development intensity, and leverage (the latter is significant at the 0.05 level). The signs of the significant coefficients are in the expected direction, indicating that smaller, less profitable, more leveraged firms, and those with a higher ratio of development costs to sales (development intensity) tend to capitalize more of their software development costs. Accordingly, we control in subsequent tests for those variables by including in the regressions the predicted value of the discriminating regression.
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Is Software Capitalization Value-Relevant?
ÒSophisticated investors will discount the earnings of software developers by the amount of capitalized development expense. The financial and investment community will discount the assets of software developers to limit the risk that balance sheets contain assets whose values are overstated. Only unsophisticated investors will be fooled.Ó (Systematics, Inc., letter to the FASB, November 13, 1984, on behalf of nine major software producers).
This letter claims that that the relevance of software capitalization ranges from the nonexistent (to sophisticated investors) to the negative (for the unsophisticated). We examine the value-relevance of software capitalization using three approaches: associating stock returns with contemporaneous financial data, associating prices with financial data, and examining the predictiveability of capitalization data with respect to subsequent earnings.
ANNUAL CAPITALIZATION DATA AND STOCK RETURNS
An association between unexpected capitalization-related items and contemporaneous annual stock returns indicates the extent to which the information contained in software capitalization is consistent with that used by investors (such an association test cannot, of course, indicate whether investors actually used capitalization data in assessing security values). We estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
where: R it is the firmÕs annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal t year-end through three months after it; ∆CAP it is the annual change in the capitalized amount of software development costs; ∆EXP it is the annual change of software development expenses of ÒexpensersÓ;
∆EXPCAP it is the annual change of the software development expense of ÒcapitalizersÓ. (For ÒcapitalizersÓ, the annual amount capitalized (CAP it ) plus the amount expensed (EXPCAP it ) equals the annual software development costs). ∆AMRT it is the annual change in the amortization of the software asset for ÒcapitalizersÓ. a it X is the adjusted (pre-software development items) annual net income of firm i in year t (i.e., reported income plus the software development expense and the amortization of the software asset). ∆ a it X is the annual change in adjusted net income. YR it is a time indicator variable that equals one if an observation is from fiscal year Y (as defined by Compustat), and zero otherwise. All right-hand variables (except YR it and CAPPRE it ) in expression (1) are scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value. The annual change form of the software variables in (1) proxies for the unexpected values of these variables.
The variable CAPPRE it in expression (1) is the predicted value for each firm-year obtained from the regression of software capitalization intensity on the five company attributes described in the preceding section (and defined in Table 2 ). We include this predicted value in regression (1) to control for company attributes systematically associated with the capitalization decision.
We applied the incremental information test suggested in Biddle et al. [1995] to expression (1). We therefore test the incremental informativeness (with respect to stock returns) of the level and changes of the independent variables. The test indicated that for capitalized software (CAP), expensed development costs of ÒexpensersÓ (EXP), and expensed costs of ÒcapitalizersÓ (EXPCAP), the annual changes of the variables are incrementally informative at better than the 0.10 level, whereas the levels of those variables are not informative. With respect to the annual amortization (AMRT), the test indicated that both level and changes are relevant. However, the level and the change of AMRT are highly correlated, so that we found it advisable to report regression results based on the change in AMRT. 16 With respect to earnings, the Biddle test indicated that both the level and changes were incrementally informative, consistent with the findings of Easton and Harris [1991] and Ohlson and Shroff [1992] . Accordingly, expression (1) includes the level and annual change of adjusted earnings.
If the change in annually capitalized development costs (∆CAP) represents value-relevant information to investors, then β 1 in (1) should be positive. Since EXP and EXPCAP (the total development costs of ÒexpensersÓ and the portion of annual development costs expensed by ÒcapitalizersÓ, respectively) likely include development expenditures incurred before technological feasibility has been achieved, we predict both β 2 and β 3 to be positive but smaller than β 1 . Our reasoning is that while firms will generally undertake positive expected value projects, achieving technological feasibility (indicated by capitalization) confirms to investors that the project has a positive expected value. We predict β 4 to be negative as it captures the unexpected decline in value of the software asset. Based on previous findings, β 5 and β 6 are predicted to be positive.
THE SOFTWARE ASSET AND SHARE PRICES
Expression (1) examines the value-relevance of the annual capitalized development costs.
To examine the value-relevance (in the association sense) of the cumulative software asset presented on the balance sheet, we used the following regression:
where, P it is firm iÕs stock price three months after fiscal year end; EPS it is reported annual earnings per share; a it BVPS is the book value of equity per share minus the capitalized software asset per share at year-end; and CAPSOFT it is the net balance of the software asset per share (YR it are year dummies defined above). If investors value the cumulative amount of capitalized software, we expect β 3 > 0.
Although equation (2) is frequently used in empirical research (e.g., Collins et al. 1997), it suffers from several shortcomings. While the variables are all per share, and firm size (BVPS) is among the independent variable, it is not clear whether scale (size) is fully controlled for. 17 Moreover, omitted variables are likely to affect the price regression (2) more than the returns regression (1), since in the latter the omitted variables which are constant over time are eliminated by the differencing operation.
CAPITALIZED SOFTWARE AND SUBSEQUENT EARNINGS
Our third set of value-relevance tests examines the association between capitalization-related variables and future earnings. Because the prediction of future earnings is of considerable importance to investors we interpret a positive association between capitalized software and subsequent earnings as evidence of value-relevance. A positive association is a priori expected, since software capitalization indicates the development program has achieved technological feasibility and the capitalized projects have, in managementÕs opinion, positive net present value. (However, if managers systematically abuse their discretion in determining technological feasibility and expected profitability of the developed projects, there should be no relation between capitalization of development costs and subsequent performance). We also test whether the development costs of firms which, as a matter of policy, fully expense them (e.g., Microsoft, Novell), are nevertheless associated with future company performance.
The following cross sectional model is used in the intertemporal test:
where: ∆ a it X is year t annual change in reported income, either operating or net income, before software development expenses (the software development and amortization expenses were added back to income when appropriate). For firms which did not deduct software development expense from operating income, we of course did not make the adjustment. We estimate expression (3) with X − is the lagged (year t-1) annual change in reported income (either operating or net income), where software development and amortization expenses were added back; ∆CAP i,t-1 is the annual change in capitalized software development costs in year t-1 relative to t-2; ∆EXP i,t-1 is the annual change in software development expense of full expensing firms in year t-1, and 0 for ÒcapitalizersÓ; ∆EXPCAP i,t-1 is the annual change in the development expense of capitalizing firms in year t-1, and 0 for ÒexpensersÓ; CAPPRE i,t-1 is the predicted value obtained from the regression of software capitalization on the five company attributes described in section 3. We Include CAPPRE i,t-1 to control for company attributes associated with the capitalization decision. All right-hand variables in equation (3) (except CAPPRE i,t-1 and the year indicators YR it ) are deflated by beginning of fiscal year t-1 market value.
We expect β 2 > 0 since projects reaching technological feasibility should increase near-term earnings. We predict β 4 to be smaller than β 2 because investment in projects that have not reached technological feasibility should take, on average, more than a year or two to be reflected in earnings.
Moreover, the development cost expensed by capitalizing firms (∆EXPCAP it ) may also reflect the cost of failed projects which, naturally, will not contribute to future earnings. We have no prediction for β 3 , since fully expensing firms provide no information to distinguish between projects before and after technological feasibility, or for the other control variables (YR it , ∆ a 1 t , i X − , and CAPPRE i,t-1 ). Table 3 We conducted two additional stock return tests. First, we substituted size-adjusted returns for raw returns as the dependent variable in (1), and found the significance levels of the estimates to be somewhat higher than those reported in Table 3 . 20 Second, we added to the sample the 33 firms eliminated because they were acquired or went bankrupt less than three years after going public (see section 2). Estimating regression (1) with those firms yielded very similar results to those reported in Table 3 .
Empirical Findings
CONTEMPOREANOUS ANALYSES
Moving from returns to stock prices, we report in Table 4 estimates from regression (2), which indicate that the coefficient of the balance sheet value of the capitalized software asset (CAPSOFT) is statistically significant and, as predicted, positive. The coefficient, however, is small relative to that of book value (0.57 vs. 2.189). However, when we estimate regression (2) on the 25 percent of the sample cases with the highest capitalization intensity, the coefficient of CAPSOFT is 1.325 (t-value = 8.39), substantially higher than that of the total sample (0.571) (results not tabulated). This coefficient (1.325) is still significantly lower (p-value of 0.054) than the estimated coefficient of equity --1.771 --in the regression of the top 25% capitalizers, indicating that investors discount, on average, the capitalized software asset relative to tangible assets.
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Panel B of Table 4 presents estimates of equation (2) Summarizing, the analyses reported above indicate that both the annual software capitalization amount and the cumulative software asset are positively and significantly associated with stock returns and prices, respectively. 21 While the software asset reported on the balance sheet appears to be discounted by investors relative to tangible assets, we find no support for the Software Publishers AssociationÕs claim that software capitalization data are irrelevant to investorsÕ decisions.
In assessing our findings, it should be noted that while over 70% of sample firms capitalize a portion of their software development costs, the capitalized portion is, on average, rather small, a fact which works against finding significant associations between capitalization-related items and capital market observables.
INTERTEMPORAL ANALYSIS
We augment the contemporaneous capital markets analysis presented above with an intertemporal test of the association between capitalization data and subsequent earnings --regression (3). 22 Earnings changes (alternatively, operating and net income) in years t and t+1 are regressed on lagged changes in capitalized software, the development costs expensed by Òexpensers,Ó and the development cost (uncapitalized portion) expensed by Òcapitalizers.Ó Lagged changes in earnings and the predicted value (CAPPRE) from regressing capitalization intensity on five company attributes (section 3) are included as control variables. We expect that the lagged change in capitalized software (∆CAP) will be positively associated with subsequent earnings, and the coefficient of lagged capitalized software (∆CAP) will be larger than that of the lagged expensed development costs of full expensers (∆EXP) and that of ÒcapitalizersÓ (∆EXPCAP), since the former reflects products which passed a feasibility test, while the latter two include both early research costs and costs of failed projects.
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Regression (3) estimates, presented in Table 5 We find that the estimated coefficients of the level and changes of reported earnings (0.441 and 0.528) are higher than the coefficients of adjusted earnings (0.265 and 0.373), and the R 2 of the former regression (0.062) is reliably larger (at the 0.08 level) than that of the latter regression (0.036). We thus find no evidence that software capitalization reduces earnings quality.
Delayed reaction to Expensing?
Evidence derived from the stock return analysis (Table 3) their profitability is, on average, higher than that of firms which capitalize development costs (see Table 2 ). A possible explanation for the insignificant coefficient of the development costs of full expensers is that, absent disclosures about the progress of projects under development, investors cannot distinguish among costs of projects that passed the feasibility stage, pre-feasibility costs, and costs of failed projects. 25 Given this uncertainty, investors may discount the development costs of full expensers.
We examine this conjecture by testing for an association between current development costs and future stock returns. Specifically, if the development costs of full expensers are discounted because of investor uncertainty about the progress of the underlying projects, the resolution of this uncertainty as projects reach fruition should induce positive returns. In contrast, the development costs of ÒcapitalizersÓ which provide information on the success of their production efforts by the act of capitalization, should not be associated with subsequent returns. This test is formalized in (4). where: R i,t+n (n = 1,2,3) is the firmÕs annual stock return in the first, second and third year after fiscal t (the return cumulation starts in the fourth month after end of fiscal t). CAP it is the annual software capitalization; EXP it is the annual software development expense of ÒexpensersÓ; and EXPCAP it is the annual software development expense of ÒcapitalizersÓ. MV it is the log of market value of firm i three months after end of fiscal year t; BETA it is the firmÕs CAPM beta calculated over 100 days before fiscal year end; LAGRET it is the firmÕs annual stock return cumulated from nine months before fiscal t year-end through three months after it; and M/B it is the firmÕs market value three months after end of fiscal year t divided by its book value. The right-hand variables CAP it , EXP it , and EXPCAP it are scaled by fiscal year t market value. Size (MV it ), risk (BETA it ), and market-tobook (M/B it ) are risk and performance control variables (e.g., Fama and French 1992). The recent return (LAGRET it ) accounts for price momentum (Brennan et al. 1997). Controlling for those risk and performance dimensions allows us to focus on the incremental association between software development costs and subsequent returns.
Estimates of (4) are reported in Table 6 for each of the three years following year t.
Consistent with our conjecture, the development costs of full expensers (EXP), which were not associated with contemporaneous returns (Table 3) , are positively and significantly associated with future returns. The size of the coefficient decreases over time as information about products under development is revealed to the market. 26 The information revelation is relatively quick (2-3 years), commensurate with the typically short production period of software products. The association between full expensersÕ development costs and subsequent returns is both statistically significant and economically meaningful; on average, first-year and second-year ahead annual returns of 3.17% and 2.12%, respectively are associated with the fully expensed development costs.
Also, as conjectured, the development costs of ÒcapitalizersÓ (CAP and EXPCAP) are not generally associated with subsequent returns. The exception is EXPCAP in the first-year ahead regression, but note its small coefficient, 0.389, relative to that of full expensers, 1.779. This suggests that capitalization information affects the contemporaneous pricing of securities. Finally, it is unlikely that the different patterns of subsequent returns of capitalizing and expensing companies are due to different risk characteristics, since various risk dimensions are accounted for in expression (4) and all firms belong to the same industry.
If, as suggested by Table 6 evidence, the full expensing of development costs is associated with a delayed investor reaction (underreaction), why donÕt all software companies capitalize development costs? Two answers are plausible. First, the delayed reaction might not be large enough to offset other managerial considerations, such as concern with analystsÕ claims that capitalization degrades the quality of earnings and the integrity of the balance sheet. Second, managers may not be aware of the uncertainty discount we document. After all, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first comprehensive evidence consistent with delayed investor reaction to full expensing of software development costs.
Why the Petition to Abolish SFAS 86?
Our analysis indicates that data on capitalized software development costs summarize information relevant to investors. What then prompted the 1996 Software Publishers Association (SPA) petition to abolish SFAS 86? This question is particularly intriguing, given the considerable implementation flexibility afforded by this standard.
An analysis of the reporting consequences of intangiblesÕ capitalization vs. expensing (e.g.,
Beaver and Ryan 1997) suggests that early in the life of a firm or an industry, when the growth of intangible investment generally exceeds the firmÕs return on equity, capitalization enhances reported income proportionately more than equity, implying a higher reported return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA) under capitalization than under full expensing. As the firm matures, its profitability generally increases while the rate of intangible investment declines; the enhancing effect of capitalization on income diminishes, while the cumulative effect of capitalization on equity or total assets increases, resulting in a higher ROE and ROA under expensing than under capitalization.
The inflection point lies close to the point where the growth rate of intangible investment equals the firmÕs ROE under expensing. From that point on, ROE (ROA) based on immediate expensing of intangible investments will be larger than ROE (ROA) based on capitalization. Similar reasoning applies to the level of reported earnings: early on, capitalization enhances reported earnings, whereas during the mature phase of operations, the increasing amortization charges of the capitalized asset largely offset the income-enhancing effect of capitalization, rendering software capitalization less attractive than full expensing in terms of maximizing reported earnings. Thus, the difference between earnings under capitalization and expensing changes over the life cycle of the firm.
Many software companies have experienced a decreasing growth rate of software development costs, and the consequent diminishing appeal of capitalization. Sample firms with eight years of data had in 1989 an average annual growth rate of software development costs (deflated by total assets) of 16.8%, declining to 5.6% in 1995. Obviously, capitalization of development costs in the mid-1990s was less attractive to these firms in terms of reported earnings than it was a decade earlier, providing incentives to lobby for the abolition of SFAS 86.
To examine our conjecture about the diminished appeal of software capitalization in the 1990s, we computed for each sample firm and year the impact of development cost capitalization on reported earnings (i.e., annually capitalized amount divided by operating earnings before software development expense), and the impact of amortization of the software asset on reported earnings (i.e., annual amortization divided by operating earnings before software development expense). The former (capitalization) factor increases reported earnings while the latter (amortization) factor decreases earnings. Similar inferences are drawn from an analysis of sample firmsÕ ROE (not reported).
FIGURE 1 HERE
Our analysis, which is based on individual firms, does not explain why the industry petitioned the FASB for abolition of SFAS 86, rather than individual firms ceasing to capitalize development costs when capitalization no longer served their purposes. We conjecture that abolition of the standard is preferred over individual changes of accounting practice, since the latter may be interpreted as an indication that the companyÕs development process faltered. Specifically, abandoning capitalization may signal that projects under development failed to reach technological feasibility required by SFAS 86 for capitalization (see appendix). In contrast, when all firms stop capitalizing because of a change in accounting standard, such negative inferences are avoided. This self-serving motive, is very difficult to substantiate empirically. We therefore focus on another, perhaps equally compelling explanation for analystsÕ opposition to capitalization, which is related to the effect of software capitalization on the accuracy of analystsÕ earnings forecasts.
Software development costs typically account for 20-30% of revenues; capitalization of an unknown portion of such a large cost component increases the difficulty of predicting the development expense (total development cost minus capitalization) and consequently predicting earnings, since the amount capitalized each period is determined by the largely unpredictable success rate and profit potential of the products under development. Analysts concerned with the size of their earnings forecast errors can therefore be expected to view capitalization negatively.
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To examine this conjecture, we computed analystsÕ relative earnings forecast errors for the sample firms (reported annual earnings per share minus Zacks analystsÕ forecasts, divided by stock price at year end). We expect a positive association between the absolute size of analystsÕ forecast errors and the extent of software capitalization. 31 We measure the extent of software capitalization by the annual amount capitalized, scaled by beginning-of-year market value (CAP in expression (5)). 32 We also control for factors related to forecast accuracy: the age (horizon) of the forecast; the number of analysts following the firm; and firm size. 33 Expression (5) where: FE it is, alternatively, absolute value of individual analystsÕ relative forecast errors, firmspecific average forecast error, and the firmÕs standard deviation of the forecast error. The forecast error is measured as the absolute value of reported annual EPS minus the forecast, scaled by end-ofyear stock price. YR it are year dummies; CAP it is the annual amount of software development cost which was capitalized by the firm, scaled by beginning-of-year market value; NUMANA it is the number of analysts following the firm; AGE it is the interval (in days) between the forecast date and the earnings announcement date; and MV it is the log of the firmÕs market value of equity at year-end. Table 7 presents estimates from the three regression versions of (5). In a regression of absolute value of individual forecast errors on capitalization intensity and market value, CAP is positively associated with the absolute size of forecast errors, and size (MV) is negatively related to the forecast error. The second regression in Table 7 reports firm-specific absolute mean forecast errors regressed on capitalization intensity and all three control variables. Capitalized development costs (CAP) are positively associated with analystsÕ mean forecast error. Forecast age and firm size are significantly associated with the mean forecast error in the expected direction. Finally, in the third regression, capitalization intensity is also significantly and positively associated with the firmspecific standard deviation of analysts forecasts.
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Our findings are thus consistent with the conjecture that analystsÕ objection to software capitalization may be related to the adverse effect of capitalization on the quality of their earnings forecasts. This conclusion seems to run counter to our previous conclusion (Section 5.2) that capitalization improves the prediction of earnings. In fact, these findings are not inconsistent since the findings in section 5.2 (and Table 5 ) are for earnings before the software expense. The analyst forecast results relate to reported earnings after the expensing of software development costs, and indicate that capitalization introduces noise to these earnings.
Concluding Remarks
We examine both the 10-year record of SFAS 86, the major exception in the US to the immediate expensing of R&D, and the validity of arguments advanced in the March 1996 petition of the Software Publishers Association (SPA) to abolish SFAS 86. Our contemporaneous (stock prices and returns) as well as intertemporal (subsequent earnings) analyses indicate that capitalizationrelated variables (annual amount capitalized, the value of the software asset and its amortization) are significantly associated with capital market variables and future earnings. We conclude that software capitalization summarizes information relevant to investors. In generalizing our findings to the capitalization of intangibles, such as R&D, it should be recalled that software capitalization reflects only the post-feasibility portion of the development cost component of R&D.
Regarding the motives underlying the SPA petition, we provide evidence that during the 1990s the appeal of software capitalization in terms of enhancing reported earnings continually diminished. As to financial analystsÕ skepticism about capitalization, we provide evidence that software capitalization is associated with larger errors in analystsÕ forecasts of earnings, due to the random element introduced to earnings by capitalization. This adverse effect of capitalization on the quality of forecasts may help explain the objection of some analysts to software capitalization in particular, and to the capitalization of intangible investments (e.g., R&D) in general. 2 Both debt and equity are measured at book values.
3 Annual capitalized software development costs divided by total development costs (i.e., the development expense plus the capitalized portion). Variable definition: CAPVAL is the annually capitalized development cost divided by yearend market value (0 for ÒexpensersÓ). MV (size) is the log of market value of equity three months after fiscal year-end. X (profitability) is net income plus the annual software amortization minus the annual capitalized software (that is, earnings under full expensing), divided by sales. Devint (development intensity) is the annual software development costs (capitalized software development plus software development expense) divided by sales. Leverage is the long-term debt divided by equity (minus the software asset), and beta (systematic risk) is the CAPM β of the stock, estimated over 100 days prior to fiscal year end. R it is the firmÕs annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal t year-end through three months after it, ∆CAP it is the annual change in software capitalization, ∆EXP it is the annual change in software development expense for firms classified as ÒexpensersÓ, ∆EXPCAP it is the annual change in software development expense for firms classified as ÒcapitalizersÓ, ∆AMRT it is the annual change in amortization of the software asset, a it X is the adjusted net income of firm i in year t (i.e., reported annual net income plus the software development expense and amortization of the software asset), a it X ∆ is the annual change in income, CAPPRE it is a predicted value obtained from regressing capitalization intensity on five company attributes (see Table 2 ). All right-hand variables (except the year intercept dummies and CAPPRE it ) are scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value.
where t j is t-statistic for year j, k j is degrees of freedom, and T is number of years.
Z 2 = mean t-statistic / (standard deviation of t-statistics / ) 1 T − . BVPS is the fiscal year-end adjusted book value per share, namely the book value of equity minus the net balance of the capitalized software asset, CAPSOFT it is the fiscal year-end balance per share of the software asset, net of the accumulated amortization.
Z 2 = mean t-statistic / (standard deviation of t-statistics / ) 1 T − . One-year ahead egression results are based on 511 firm years (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . Second-year ahead t+1 regression results are based on 402 firm years (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) . The regressions include year intercept dummies (not reported). Reported t-statistics are based on White [1980] standard errors.
The dependent variables are: ∆OI it is the change in operating income in year t where development and amortization expenses are added back, and ∆NI it is the change in net income in year t where development and amortization expenses are added back. ∆OI i,t+1 is the change in operating income in year t+1 where development and amortization expenses are added back, and ∆NI i,t+1 is the change in net income in year t+1 where development and amortization expenses are added back. The independent variables are: ∆OI i,t-1 and ∆NI i,t-1 are the lagged (year t-1) annual change in OI and NI, respectively, ∆CAP i,t-1 is the annual change in the amount of capitalized software development costs in year t-1, ∆EXP i,t-1 is the annual change in the development expense for full expensing firms in year t-1 and 0 for ÒcapitalizersÓ, ∆EXPCAP i,t-1 is the annual change in the development expense for capitalizing firms in year t-1 and 0 for ÒexpensersÓ, CAPPRE i,t-1 is the predicted value from a first stage regression defined in Table 2 . All left-hand and right-hand variables (except CAPPRE it and YR it ) are deflated by beginning of respective fiscal year market value. R it is the firmÕs future annual stock return in years t+1, t+2, and t+3. CAP it is the annual software capitalization, EXP it is the annual software development expense for firms classified as ÒexpensersÓ, EXPCAP it is the annual software development expense for firms classified as ÒcapitalizersÓ, MV it is the log of market value of firm i three months after end of fiscal year t. BETA it is the firmÕs CAPM beta, calculated over 100 days before fiscal year end. LAGRET it is the firmÕs annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal t year-end through three months after it. M/B it is the firmÕs market value three months after end of fiscal year t divided by the firmÕs book value. The right-hand variables CAP it , EXP it , and EXPCAP it are scaled by fiscal year t market value. The dependent variables are: AFE it is the absolute value of analyst forecast errors defined as reported EPS minus analyst forecast, deflated by price. MAFE it is the firm-specific mean absolute forecast error (to be included in the regression at least three analyst forecasts per firm are required). STDFE it is the standard deviation of the individual analyst forecasts around the consensus (to be included in the regression at least three analyst forecasts per firm are required). The independent variables are: CAP it is the annual capitalized software costs divided by market value at beginning of year. NUMANA it is the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. AGE it is the age of the forecast (in days), defined as the earnings announcement date minus the forecast date. MV it is the log of the firmÕs market value at the end of fiscal year t. The conditions specified by SFAS 86 for the establishment of technological feasibility are essentially:
1. The detail program design has been completed, and all the technical requirements are met to produce the software.
2.
The enterprise has confirmed completion of the program design and that there are no technological uncertainties concerning development issues.
All development costs incurred during the second stage Ð Ð from the establishment of technological feasibility to the date when the software is ready to be released to customers Ð Ð should be capitalized as an asset (to be presented on the balance sheet as a long-term asset) and subsequently amortized. This capitalization lies at the core of the current study.
During the third stage Ð Ð from ready-to-be-sold to the date of sale Ð Ð the enterprise incurs Òinventory costs,Ó such as duplicating software masters, developing training material and packaging.
These costs are capitalized as inventory on a unit-specific basis and are charged to cost of sales as the products are sold.
The fourth and last stage of software project development starts with the software sale. All costs subsequently incurred (e.g., for maintenance and support) are immediately expensed.
The cumulative capitalized production costs (during stage 2), namely the software asset, are amortized on a product-by-product basis. The greater of the amounts computed by the following two methods should be used: (1) straight-line amortization over the expected useful life of the software product, or (2) the Ògross revenue ratioÓ method, where the ratio of actual software revenues during the year to total estimated revenues in the current and future years, determines the annual amortization.
* Based on B. Jarnagin, 1993.
Finally, at the end of each year, the unamortized software asset has to be written down (if 1 The essence of this statement is presented in the appendix.
2 Software capitalization starts upon the establishment of technological feasibility of the product under development.
The preceding research costs are fully expensed; see appendix.
3 For ADAPSOÕs position on software capitalization, as well as the heated debate on the merits of the 1985 software capitalization exposure draft (e.g., over 200 comment letters sent to the FASB), see FASB Public Record [1985] .
11 It is relatively easy for software companies to justify immediate expensing. For example, SFAS 86 requires that the expected net realizable value of the project exceed the capitalized value of the software asset. Given the subjectivity in assessing expected net realizable values, it seems that managers preferring immediate expensing can easily justify this approach.
12 Following are descriptions of the four product-types taken from financial reports: Engineering --ÒThe firm designs, produces and markets proprietary computer software products for use in computer aided engineering.Ó Education and Entertainment --ÒDevelops, publishes, manufactures and distributes high quality educational software products for home and school use.Ó Business Applications --ÒDevelops, licenses and markets system software products, including monitoring and event management tools, back up and recovery products, and data-base administration tools to improve performance, reliability and manageability of large scale mainframe systems software, open systems data bases and various other systems.Ó PC Packaged Software --ÒDesigns, develops, and markets systems and application software which enables users to work with professional creative tools, assemble illustrations, image and text into fully formatted documents, output documents directly to any kind of printing device and distribute documents on paper, video or compact disc, over an e-mail system, corporate network, on-line service, or the internet.Ó 13 A period has a minimum of three years. Eight firms expensed in the first period and capitalized in the subsequent period and four firms capitalized in the first period and expensed in the second period.
14 We obtained similar regression estimates when the dependent variable was scaled by sales and when we employed a logit analysis (1 for capitalizers and 0 for full expensers) instead of the regression analysis in Table 2 . 15 The following variables were also included in various versions of the regression analysis of 25 Recall that SFAS 86 is intended to enable investors to make such a distinction. 26 We also estimated regression (4) for individual years 1985-1994 (not reported in Table 6 ). The across-year significance tests indicate the coefficient of EXP is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all three subsequent years (in Table 6 , pooled results, the coefficient is insignificant in the third year). 27 The decreasing bars in 1993-1995 in figure 1 may convey the impression of a fast falling rate of software capitalization and amortization. This, however, is not the case. As indicated by the bottom numbers in parentheses (to the right of the year), the decreasing capitalization and amortization impact on earnings during 1993-95 was mainly due to the increasing denominator Ð operating income before development costs expensing.
Operating income increased at the median from $11.02 million in 1992 to $15.11 million 1995. 28 We do not claim that our conjecture about the diminishing appeal of capitalization in the 1990s is the only motive of software companies to abolish SFAS 86. There may be, for example, validity to the SPA arguments that . 30 The sample data on the relative volatility of software development expenses with and without capitalization are consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, we computed for capitalizing firms with at least six years of data in the sample the firm-specific variance of total annual development costs and the part of the cost that was expensed. By our conjecture, the former (which is analogous to the software expense of full expensing firms) should be smaller than the latter. This indeed is the case; the sample mean (median) of the variances is 0.0957 (0.0630) for total development costs and 0.1319 (0.0804) for the expensed part of development costs (i.e., total cost minus
